

Nominal Terms with a Hierarchy of Variables Or ... **when** are unknowns?

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Health warning:

I'm still busy inventing this stuff.

This material probably consists mostly of errors.

If this doesn't make sense, tell me — and wait for the paper.

Thanks for finding time to come.

Motivation

‘Normal’ substitution is capture-avoiding on bound variables. E.g.

$$(\forall x. x = y)[y \mapsto x] \equiv \forall x'. x' = x \quad (\lambda x. (\lambda y. xy))y \rightarrow \lambda y'. yy'$$

‘Context’ substitution is not. E.g.

$P \cong Q$ when in all **process contexts** C , $C[P] \downarrow$ if and only if $C[Q] \downarrow$.

Normally these are understood as phenomena related purely to syntax. I would like some semantic account. (This means technically that I have to give x a semantics independently of some ambient evaluation to closed terms, and a similar but not identical one to the hole $[-]$ in $C[-]$, as well as to C itself.)

\forall and \exists from first-order logic have symmetric intro-rules:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. P, \Delta} (\forall R) \quad (x \notin \Gamma, \Delta) \qquad \frac{\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \exists x. P \vdash \Delta} (\exists L) \quad (x \notin \Gamma, \Delta)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, P[x \mapsto s] \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \forall x. P \vdash \Delta} (\forall L) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash P[x \mapsto s], \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. P, \Delta} (\exists R)$$

There are explanations of where these symmetries come from, a great example of which is adjunctions in category theory. These presume a typed environment and introduce, in effect, functions — but weren't we doing first-order logic?

I want something inherently type- and function-free. I also want to decompose \forall and \exists into a simpler self-dual quantifier (**self-dual** meaning that the intro-rules on left and right are identical except for the side of the sequent they act on).

Motivation

Records and unstructured datatypes, for example `customer.ID : \mathbb{N}` are generally modelled using either table lookups, lists, or functions. I want a notion of unstructured data which is *atomic*, that is, relies on *no implementational overhead*. This exists, e.g. in the Cardelli-Abadi object calculus, but I want it in a generic framework which is not specifically tailored to this one job.

I also want to model component-based semantics which involve graphs being substituted into other graphs, possibly with rewiring of edges during the substitution. Again, I want this with no specific implementational overhead (e.g., explicitly modelling graphs!).

Can we do this?

Is there a single system which will exhibit all of these disparate phenomena as aspects of a single, preferably rather elementary, system? Can we give this system a simple semantics.

Yes.

Very simple. I'll give an equational system (the only judgement is equality $s = t$).

If you know Nominal Algebraic Specifications (work with Aad Mathijssen), you can think of what you are about to see as NAS on steroids and speed. (Though that is only a first approximation.)

Assume **base data sorts** δ , one of which is **propositions** o . **Sorts** σ, τ and **arities** ρ are:

$$\sigma, \tau ::= \delta \mid [\sigma]\sigma \quad \rho ::= (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)\sigma.$$

Here n may equal zero.

For $i \geq 1$ and sort σ assume **variable symbols** $a_\sigma^i, b_\sigma^i, c_\sigma^i$ of **level** i and sort σ — we may drop the annotations.

Assume **term-formers** $f : \rho$.

Then terms are:

$$s, t, u, v ::= a_\sigma^i \mid f_{(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)\sigma}(s_{\sigma_1}, \dots, s_{\sigma_n}) \mid ([a_\sigma^i]s_\tau)_{[\sigma]\tau} \mid \forall a_\sigma. s_o.$$

Or, without annotations:

$$s, t, u, v ::= a \mid f(s, \dots, s) \mid [a]s \mid \forall a. s.$$

Sorts and terms

$s, t, u, v ::= a_{\sigma}^i \mid f_{(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)\sigma}(s_{\sigma_1}^{i_1}, \dots, s_{\sigma_n}^{i_n}) \mid ([a_{\sigma}^i]s_{\tau})_{[\sigma]\tau} \mid \forall a_{\sigma}.s_o.$

Assume term-formers:

- $\supset_{(o,o)_o}$ **implication**.
- $=_{(\sigma,\sigma)_o}$ **equality** (one for each σ).
- $\perp_{()_o}$ **false**.
- $\sigma_{([\sigma']\sigma,\sigma')\sigma}$ **explicit substitution** (one for each σ, σ').

Use standard sugar. $[a]s$ is called **abstract a in s** , $\forall a.s$ is **new (or fresh) a in s** . \forall binds, abstraction does not. Write $s[a \mapsto t]$ for $\sigma([a]s, t)$.

Some examples

1. \perp_o is a truth value. We know what it is and it represents itself.
2. a_o^1 is a variable. It represents a truth value we do not know today, but we will learn whether it is $\top \equiv \perp \supset \perp$ or \perp , **tomorrow**.
3. X_o^2 is also a variable. We will only find out what it is this evening — we may, for example, learn that it is \perp , but we may also learn that it is a .
4. χ_o^3 is also a variable. We will find out what it is, oh, sometime early this afternoon.
5. a_o^{1000} is also a variable. Let's find out what it is right now. Any suggestions?

It's lonely standing up here all alone. Look at my sad face. Make me smile!

Some examples

- $[a]a_o$ is, well never mind what it is, but write it $*$. It lives in $[o]o$.
- $[a]b$ is just b .
- $[a]X$ waits to find out what X is; if X becomes a then it becomes $[a]a$, if X becomes b it becomes $[a]b$, if X becomes \perp it becomes $[a]\perp$, and so on.
- $f(s_1, \dots, s_n)$ is f applied to s_1 to s_n . No tricks. However, f may become something else as a function of its arguments becoming something else.
- $\mathcal{N}a.s$ generates a *fresh* a . This will never become anything, but we can use it as a ‘generic unknown’, e.g. to build $[a]a$ or $[a]X$.

Some examples

- $a[a \mapsto b]$ is b . $X[a \mapsto b]$ is X which has been told that a maps to b . This evening when X becomes something, the substitution $[a \mapsto b]$ will pounce on it.
- $X[a \mapsto Y]$ is allowed by the syntax. We simply learn what X and Y become, and whatever the substitution becomes acts on whatever X becomes. No sweat.
- $a[X \mapsto b]$ is a . By the time a becomes anything else, X is long gone.

\supset , $=$, and \perp are as usual.

Axioms

We now say that all in axioms:

$$P \supset (Q \supset P) = \top \quad (Q \supset R) \supset (P \supset Q) \supset (P \supset R) = \top$$
$$\neg\neg P = P$$

$$f(a_1[a \mapsto x], \dots, a_n[a \mapsto x]) = f(a_1, \dots, a_n)[a \mapsto x]$$

$$([a^i]x)[b^j \mapsto y] = [a^i](x[b^j \mapsto y]) \quad j > i$$

$$a^i \# y \supset (([a^i]x)[b^j \mapsto y] = [a^i](x[b^j \mapsto y])) = \top \quad i \leq j$$

$$([a]x)[a \mapsto y] = [a]x$$

$$(b \# x \supset [a]x = [b](x[a \mapsto b])) = \top$$

$$(b \# x \supset x[a \mapsto b][b \mapsto y] = x[a \mapsto y]) = \top$$

$$a[a \mapsto x] = x \quad b^i[a^i \mapsto x] = b$$

... just a few more:

$$a\#a = \perp \quad (\forall y.a\#(X[x\mapsto y])) = a\#[x]X$$

$$(\forall a.\perp) = \perp$$

$$((\forall a.P) \supset Q) = (\forall a.(P \supset Q)) \quad a \notin Q$$

$$(P \supset (\forall a.Q)) = (\forall a.(P \supset Q)) \quad a \notin P$$

$$(\forall a.P)[b\mapsto Q] = \forall a.(P[b\mapsto Q]) \quad a \notin Q$$

$$(\forall a.P) = (\forall a.a\#x \wedge P) \quad (\forall a.P) = (\forall a.x\#a \wedge P)$$

$$(a\#Y \supset (Y = Y[a\mapsto X])) = \top \quad (X = X) = \top$$

$$((X = Y) \wedge C[X]) = ((X = Y) \wedge C[Y])$$

Our first definition

Use $a\#s$ as a macro for $(\forall c.s[a\mapsto c]) = s$ and say a is fresh for s .

As a term-former $\#$ would have arity $([\sigma]o)o$ (one $\#$ for each σ).

Intuitively it is clear (*is it?*) that $a\#s$ means ‘ a does not occur unabstracted in s ’. This statement may transcend syntactic fact, e.g. $a\#X$ is an assertion about what happens this evening.

Then the conditions $a\#x$ scattered about the axioms are simply ‘capture-avoidance’ conditions.

Implementing \forall and \exists

$$\forall a. \phi \equiv \mathcal{V}c.(a\#\phi \wedge \phi[a \mapsto c]) \quad \exists a. \phi \equiv \mathcal{V}c.(a\#\phi \supset \phi[a \mapsto c])$$

These have the expected behaviour, for example:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{V}c.(a\#\phi \wedge \phi[a \mapsto c]) \supset \phi[a \mapsto s] &= \\ \mathcal{V}c.(a\#\phi \wedge (\phi[a \mapsto s] = \phi) \wedge (\phi[a \mapsto c] = \phi) \wedge \phi[a \mapsto c]) \supset \phi[a \mapsto s] &= \\ \mathcal{V}c.\top = \top. & \end{aligned}$$

It is possible (and quite interesting!) to verify that $\forall a. \phi = \neg \exists a. \neg \phi$.

Implementing the λ -calculus (algebraically!)

Introduce a term-former $\cdot([\sigma']\sigma, \sigma')$ and an axiom

$$([a]X) \cdot Y = X[a \mapsto Y].$$

The rest of the system takes care of substitution.

Also possible to directly implement the NEW calculus of contexts, i.e. to add in \mathcal{N} and abstract over the full hierarchy of variables. Thus, this ‘ λ -calculus’ is *actually* a λ -calculus of contexts, with stronger variables playing the contexts.

Records

Fix constants 1 and 2 . l and m have level 1, X has level 2.

Here is a record:

$$X[l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2]$$

Here is record lookup:

$$\begin{aligned} X[l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2][X \mapsto m] &= X[l \mapsto 1][X \mapsto m][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= X[X \mapsto m][l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= m[l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= m[m \mapsto 2] \\ &= 2. \end{aligned}$$

In-place update

$$\begin{aligned} X[l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2][X \mapsto X[l \mapsto 2]] &= X[l \mapsto 1][X \mapsto X[l \mapsto 2]][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= X[X \mapsto X[l \mapsto 2]][l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= X[l \mapsto 2][l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2] \\ &= X[l \mapsto 2][m \mapsto 2] \end{aligned}$$

Substitution-as-a-term

$(\lambda X.X[l \mapsto \lambda n.n])$ applied to lm

$$(\lambda X.X[l \mapsto \lambda n.n])lm = X[l \mapsto \lambda n.n][X \mapsto lm] = (\lambda n.n)m$$

In-place update as a term

$\lambda \mathcal{W}. \mathcal{W}[X \mapsto X[l \mapsto 2]]$ applied to $X[l \mapsto 1][m \mapsto 2]$

... and so on (\mathcal{W} has level 3).

I'm *telling* you we can proceed to global state (the world is a big hole with state suspended on it, just like a record), and Abadi-Cardelli imp- ϵ object calculus.

Graphs are speculative; I haven't implemented them. I mentioned it only to give you some idea of the directions I am thinking in. However, this work may have applications to component-based systems, with strong variables controlling how components are 'plugged in'.

The usual higher-order version of the axiom of choice:

$$\forall x. \exists y. (\phi xy) \Leftrightarrow \exists f. \forall x. (\phi x(fx)).$$

May be true of individual ϕ , but the general assertion over all ϕ asserts that there always exists a function picking out *some* y for each x .

Our ‘hierarchy’-based version (*I think*):

$$\forall x^1. \exists y^1. \phi \Leftrightarrow \exists Y^2. \forall x. (\phi[y \mapsto Y]).$$

Here ϕ is a sufficiently strong variable of sort o . For example (this works even without an axiom, because we have the terms to do it):

$$(\forall x. \exists y. x=y) = \top. \quad (\exists Y. \forall x. x=Y) = \top$$

calculations omitted, but basically we substitute Y for x on the right-hand side. This gets captured by the \forall , which is for a weaker (later) variable.

Semantics

A **model** of a theory consists of the following data:

1. For each base data sort D , a set $\llbracket D \rrbracket^\bullet$. Extend this to all sorts as follows:

$$\llbracket S' \times S \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket S' \rrbracket^\bullet \times \llbracket S \rrbracket^\bullet \quad \llbracket [S']S \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket S \rrbracket^\bullet \cup \{*\}.$$

$\llbracket S \rrbracket^\bullet \cup \{*\}$ adjoins a new element to $\llbracket S \rrbracket^\bullet$.

2. For $f : (S')S$ choose $\llbracket f \rrbracket^\bullet$ a function from $\llbracket S' \rrbracket^\bullet$ to $\llbracket S \rrbracket^\bullet$.

Call $\llbracket - \rrbracket^\bullet$ the **closed section**.

Semantics

Define

$$\mathbb{T}_\sigma^0 = [\sigma]^\bullet \quad \mathbb{T}_\sigma^{i+1} = (\forall^{i+1} \xrightarrow{\text{fin}} \mathbb{T}^i) \xrightarrow{\text{fin}} \mathbb{T}_\sigma^i$$

Write \mathbb{T}^i for $\bigcup_i \mathbb{T}_\sigma^i$, \mathbb{T}_σ for $\bigcup_\sigma \mathbb{T}_\sigma^i$, and \mathbb{T} for $\bigcup_{i,\sigma} \mathbb{T}_\sigma^i$.

I am afraid that all the hard work is hidden in the definition of $\xrightarrow{\text{fin}}$, and in proving its (excellent) properties. That's what took me six months to work out. I shall conclude by sketching the construction...

Permutations

Write $\pi \in \mathbb{P}$ for **level-preserving finitely supported bijections on variables**. π is a bijection such that:

- $\pi(a)$ has the same level as a always (whence ‘level-preserving’).
- $\pi(a) = a$ for all variables, **except** for some finite set (whence ‘finitely supported’).

Write **ld** for the **identity permutation** mapping a to a always. Write composition of permutations $\pi \circ \pi'$. This is given by functional composition.

A **\mathbb{P} -action** on \mathbb{S} is $\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{S}$, write it infix as $\pi \cdot s$, such that $\pi \cdot (\pi' \cdot s) = (\pi \circ \pi') \cdot s$ and **ld** $\cdot s = s$.

Permutations

Say $s \in \mathbb{S}$ is **supported by** A a set of variables when if $\pi(a) = \pi'(a)$ for all $a \in A$ then $\pi \cdot s = \pi' \cdot s$ (say that A **supports** s). Say \mathbb{S} has **finite support** when all its elements have a **finite** supporting set.

Lemma: *Suppose \mathbb{S} has a finitely supported \mathbb{P} -action and $s \in \mathbb{S}$.*

Then:

- 1. s has a unique smallest finite supporting set; call it the **support** of s and write it $\text{supp}(s)$.*
- 2. $a \in \text{supp}(s)$ if and only if for all but finitely many b , $(b a) \cdot s = s$.*
- 3. $a \in \text{supp}(s)$ if and only if for any other $b \notin \text{supp}(s)$, $(c b) \cdot s = s$.*

Permutations

The typical example of a set with a \mathbb{P} -action is a set of syntax, where π acts literally on the variables mentioned in the syntax; then (finite) syntax is obviously supported by the finite set of variables mentioned in its syntax.

Functions $f \in \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{S}'$ have a \mathbb{P} -action given by $(\pi \cdot f)(\pi \cdot s) = \pi \cdot (f(s))$.

E.g. in \mathbb{T}^i above $\kappa \in \mathbb{V}^i \rightarrow \mathbb{S}$ has a natural permutation action given by $(\pi \cdot \kappa)(\pi \cdot a) = \pi \cdot \kappa(a)$.

Write $\mathbb{V}^i \xrightarrow{fin} \mathbb{S}$ for the set of finitely supported functions from \mathbb{V}^i to \mathbb{S} .

Permutations

$\tau \in (\mathbb{V}^i \xrightarrow{fin} \mathbb{S}) \rightarrow \mathbb{S}'$ also has a natural permutation action. Write $(\mathbb{V}^i \xrightarrow{fin} \mathbb{S}) \xrightarrow{fin} \mathbb{S}'$ for the set of τ such that:

1. τ has a finite supporting set.
2. There exists some finite $A \subseteq \mathbb{V}^i$ such that if κ and κ' agree on A then $\tau(\kappa) = \tau(\kappa')$ (we say that τ has **no asymptotic behaviour**).

The intuition is that τ only examines a finite part of κ ; it must ‘ignore what κ does to most variables’.

The fundamental result

If τ examines arguments κ at a then for all but finitely many b ,
 $(a\ b) \cdot \tau \neq \tau$.

Semantics (sketched)

- $\llbracket a^i \rrbracket^i = \lambda \kappa^i . \kappa(a)$.
- $\llbracket a^i \rrbracket^j = \lambda \kappa^j . \llbracket a \rrbracket^{j-1}$ for $j > i$.
- $\llbracket a^i \rrbracket^j$ is not defined for $j < i$.
- Write $\llbracket f \rrbracket^0$ for $\llbracket f \rrbracket^\bullet$.
- Define $\llbracket f \rrbracket^i : \llbracket S_1 \rrbracket^i \times \cdots \times \llbracket S_n \rrbracket^i \rightarrow \llbracket S \rrbracket^i$ by
$$\llbracket f \rrbracket^i \kappa^i = \lambda \tau_1 \in \llbracket S_1 \rrbracket^i \cdots \tau_n \in \llbracket S_n \rrbracket^i . \llbracket f \rrbracket^{i-1} (\tau_1 \kappa, \dots, \tau_n \kappa).$$
- Then $\llbracket f(t_1, \dots, t_n) \rrbracket^i \kappa^i = \llbracket f \rrbracket^i (\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket^i \kappa, \dots, \llbracket t_n \rrbracket^i \kappa)$ whenever $\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket^i, \dots, \llbracket t_n \rrbracket^i$ are all defined, and is undefined otherwise.

Semantics (sketched some more)

- $\llbracket [a]t \rrbracket^i = [a]\llbracket t \rrbracket^i$ provided that a has level at most i , and $\llbracket t \rrbracket^i$ is defined.
- Write \perp for $\llbracket \perp \rrbracket^i$, for any i . Write \top for $\llbracket \perp \supset \perp \rrbracket^i$.
- $\llbracket s = t \rrbracket^i$ is undefined if $\llbracket s \rrbracket^i$ or $\llbracket t \rrbracket^i$ is undefined. If they *are* defined then $\llbracket s = t \rrbracket^i = \top$ if $\llbracket s \rrbracket^i = \llbracket t \rrbracket^i$ and $\llbracket s = t \rrbracket^i = \perp$ otherwise.
- If $\llbracket t \rrbracket^i$ is not defined or $j > i$ then $\llbracket a^j \# t \rrbracket^i$ is not defined. Otherwise: $\llbracket a \# t \rrbracket = \top$ if $a \# \llbracket t \rrbracket^i$, and $\llbracket a \# t \rrbracket = \perp$ if $a \not\# \llbracket t \rrbracket^i$.

Summary

I have given an equational system with the power to express some sophisticated concepts in terms of a few basic primitives (abstraction and λ , plus predicate logic, and of course the hierarchy of variables).

The real difference from higher-order frameworks (e.g. HOL) is that in HOL we say what *can* appear in a term (by applying that term to the argument). In this system (*what to call it?*), we say what *cannot* appear in a term (by asserting a freshness $\#$ or choosing the levels right).

Finally, I have given a semantics which has a simple intuition (tomorrow, this evening, this afternoon) but really quite subtle to get right — though I have not gone into details.