

Nominal Algebra:

a **NEW** mathematics of variables

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Nominal algebra

It is possible to look at nominal algebra in two ways:

- **Viewpoint 1.** A proof-system and associated semantics which **look** like universal algebra (the logic and semantics of equality) but which admit **quantifiers** in a particularly intuitive manner.
- **Viewpoint 2.** A logic for a semantics in which names are first-class citizens.

Let me explain.

Motivation according to Viewpoint 1

- $\lambda a.t$ untyped λ -calculus (LAM)
- $\forall a.\phi$ first-order predicate logic (FOL)
- $\int f da$ school/kindergarten

These expressions all have in common:

- Object-level variables a .
- Meta-level variables t , u , ϕ , or f .
- Operators (or term-formers or function-symbols) λ , \forall , \int .

Nominal Terms

Nominal terms are a **syntax** inductively generated by

$$t ::= a \mid \pi X \mid [a]t \mid f(t, \dots, t).$$

Here:

- $a, b, c, \dots \in \mathbb{A}$ are **atoms**.
- $X, Y, Z, \dots \in \mathbb{V}$ are **unknowns**.
- f, g, \dots are **term-formers** or **operators** etcetera (depends on whether we're thinking in syntax or semantics).
- $[a]t$ is an **abstraction**.
- π is a **permutation**. I'll come to it later. Please ignore it for now.

Nominal Algebra representations

$$t ::= a \mid \pi X \mid [a]t \mid f(t, \dots, t).$$

The a look like object-level variable symbols — the ones that get abstracted:

- $\lambda a.t$ untyped λ -calculus (LAM)
- $\forall a.\phi$ first-order predicate logic (FOL)
- $\int f d a$ school/kindergarten

Nominal Algebra representations

$$t ::= a \mid \pi X \mid [a]t \mid f(t, \dots, t).$$

Abstraction $[a]t$ represents abstraction:

- $\lambda[a]t$ untyped λ -calculus (LAM)
- $\forall[a]\phi$ first-order predicate logic (FOL)
- $\int([a]f)d$ school/kindergarten

Nominal Algebra representations

$$t ::= a \mid \pi X \mid [a]t \mid \mathbf{f}(t, \dots, t).$$

‘Logical operators’ such as λ , \forall , $\int d$, and so on, are represented by operators:

- $\lambda[a]t$ untyped λ -calculus (LAM)
- $\forall[a]\phi$ first-order predicate logic (FOL)
- $\int([a]f)d$ school/kindergarten

Nominal Algebra representations

$$t ::= a \mid \pi X \mid [a]t \mid f(t, \dots, t).$$

X is another kind of variable, representing an unknown entity like t , u , and ϕ :

- $\lambda[a]X$ untyped λ -calculus (LAM)
- $\forall[a]P$ first-order predicate logic (FOL)
- $\int d([a]X)$ school/kindergarten

$\lambda[a]X$, $\forall[a]X$, and $\int d([a]X)$ are nominal algebra terms.

(Sorry for the notational jiggery-pokery with \int .)

λ -calculus theory LAM

Assume term-formers λ , app , and Σ . Sugar $app(t, u)$ to tu (here t and u range over **nominal** terms!). Sugar $\Sigma([a]t, u)$ to $t[a \mapsto u]$.

Algebra is a logic of equality. Therefore assertions should take the form $t = u$. A theory is a collection of assertions we call **axioms**.

LAM has one axiom:

$$(\beta) \quad (\lambda[a]Y)X = Y[a \mapsto X]$$

Theory of first-order logic FOL

Bit more complex:

$$\begin{array}{ll} P \Rightarrow Q \Rightarrow P = \top & (P \Rightarrow Q) \Rightarrow (Q \Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow (P \Rightarrow R) = \top \\ \neg\neg P \Rightarrow P = \top & \forall[a](P \wedge Q) \Leftrightarrow \forall[a]P \wedge \forall[a]Q = \top \\ \perp \Rightarrow P = \top & a\#P \vdash \forall[a](P \Rightarrow Q) \Leftrightarrow (P \Rightarrow \forall[a]Q) = \top \\ T = T = \top & \forall[a]P \Rightarrow P[a \mapsto T] = \top \\ \top \Rightarrow P = P & U = T \wedge P[a \mapsto T] \Rightarrow P[a \mapsto U] = \top \end{array}$$

(Assume term-formers $=, \forall, \Rightarrow, \perp, \Sigma$, and sugar.)

Freshness assertions $a\#t$

Read $a\#t$ as

- ' a does not occur unabstracted in t ', or
- ' a is fresh for t '.

There is a logic to freshness. It's pretty straightforward:

Freshness derivation rules

$$\frac{}{a\#b} (\#\mathbf{ab}) \quad \frac{a\#t_1 \cdots a\#t_n}{a\#f(t_1, \dots, t_n)} (\#\mathbf{f})$$

$$\frac{}{a\#[a]t} (\#\mathbf{[]a}) \quad \frac{a\#t}{a\#[b]t} (\#\mathbf{[]b}) \quad \frac{\pi^{-1}(a)\#X}{a\#\pi X} (\#\mathbf{X})$$

Permutations

I suppose you really want to know about π now.

Here's one more theory. A **theory of α -equivalence**:

$$(\alpha) \quad b\#X \Rightarrow [b](b\ a)X = [a]X.$$

Since $b\#X$ we can intuitively read $(b\ a)X$ as ' $X[a \mapsto b]$ '. Then the rule above is the usual α -renaming rule.

We need permutation in order to rename atoms, to avoid capture etc.

Permutations

It is possible to base a mathematical theory on renamings $[a \mapsto b]$ instead of permutations $(a\ b)$. I was doing that with Martin last year.

However invertibility loses no power and has better properties.

I.e. $(a\ b)[a]X \equiv [b](a\ b)X$, whereas perhaps $([a]X)[b \mapsto a] \equiv ([a'](X[a \mapsto a'])[b \mapsto a])$ where we assume $a' \# X$ — it's not actually **impossible**, but it **is** more complicated.

Limited brainpower \Rightarrow invest it wisely.

Equality derivation rules (easy)

$$\frac{}{t = t} \text{ (refl)} \quad \frac{t = u}{u = t} \text{ (symm)} \quad \frac{t = u \quad u = v}{t = v} \text{ (tran)}$$

$$\frac{t = u}{C[t] = C[u]} \text{ (cong)} \quad \frac{a\#t \quad b\#t}{(a \ b) \cdot t = t} \text{ (perm)}$$

For example

$$\frac{\frac{}{a\#b} (\#\mathbf{ab}) \quad \frac{}{a\#b} (\#\mathbf{ab})}{[a]a = [b]b} (\mathbf{perm})$$

$$(b\ a) \cdot [b]b \equiv [a]a$$

$$\frac{\frac{b\#X}{b\#[a]X} (\#\mathbf{[]a}) \quad \frac{}{a\#[a]X} (\#\mathbf{[]a})}{[b](b\ a)X = [a]X} (\mathbf{perm})$$

$$(b\ a) \cdot [a]X \equiv [b](b\ a)X$$

Here \equiv is syntactic identity.

Semantics

The theories of first-order logic and of the λ -calculus permit reasoning **exactly** like informal practice. See the papers [oneaah], [capasn], and [nomsst].

When we would α -rename, we instead use a permutation. When we would assume $a \notin \text{fn}(\phi)$, we instead write $a\#P$.

Semantics (Viewpoint 2)

Do not think that this is trivial.

Something very interesting has happened in Nominal Algebra: a , b , c , ... are populating the semantics. Yet they can also be renamed and abstracted.

In Nominal Algebra **names are first-class citizens**, represented by atoms.

We can give them special properties just by imposing axioms.

For example substitution.

Theory of substitution SUB

$$f(X_1, \dots, X_n)[a \mapsto T] = f(X_1[a \mapsto T], \dots, X_n[a \mapsto T])$$

$$b \# T \vdash ([b]X)[a \mapsto T] = [b](X[a \mapsto T])$$

$$a[a \mapsto T] = T$$

$$a \# X \vdash X[a \mapsto T] = X$$

$$b \# X \vdash X[a \mapsto b] = (b \ a)X$$

Picture of what we have done

- \equiv is syntactic identity $[a]a \not\equiv [b]b$
- $=$ (with (α)) is α -equivalence $b\#X \vdash [b](b\ a)X = [a]x$
- $=_{\text{SUB}}$ is substitution $b\#Y \vdash Y[b \mapsto X] = Y$
- $=_{\text{LAM}}$ is $\alpha\beta$ -equivalence $(\lambda[a]a)b = b$
- $=_{\text{FOL}}$ is logical equivalence $(\forall[a](a = a)) = \top$

See [oneaah,oneaah-jv,capasn,nomsst].

Some really beautiful maths (soundness, completeness, sequent rules, cut-elimination, decidability, etc).

Theory of substitution SUB (the return!!)

I'd like to discuss SUB. I think that SUB is very important.

What are the properties of names a, b, c, \dots ?

- They are atomic: ' a ' has no internal structure.
- They may be renamed and abstracted.
- They are not *das Ding an sich*: ' $a = b$ ' is just false.

Nominal algebra with (α) is a logical theory of names.

Names vs. variables

What are the properties of **variables** x, y, z, \dots ?

- They are atomic: ' x ' has no internal structure.
- They may be renamed and abstracted.
- They may be substituted for.
- They are not **das Ding an sich**: ' $x = y$ ' may be true or false (depending on what we substitute for them).

... and they turn up in most formal languages of note, from **first-order logic** to **JAVA**.

Nominal algebra plus **SUB** is a theory of variables!

Names vs. variables

So: A **variable** is a **name with a substitution action**.

And now for the punchline: let's consider the class of all models of **SUB**. Is it cartesian closed? Because if it is, then we can design λ -calculi and thus programming-languages in which variables are (names with a substitution action and so are) first-class citizens of the underlying domain.

Models of substitution

A model \mathbb{X} is:

- An **underlying (nominal) set** $|\mathbb{X}|$.
- An **interpretation function** assigning to each atom a some element $|a| \in |\mathbb{X}|$.
- An interpretation of substitution is a map $([A]|\mathbb{X}|) \times \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{X}$.

... validating the axioms of **SUB**.

Models of substitution

Oops. I forgot to mention that if X is a nominal set then $[\mathbb{A}]X$ is the **abstraction-set**, and if $t \in X$ then $[a]t \in [\mathbb{A}]X$.

$[\mathbb{A}]X$ has underlying (normal) set $(\mathbb{A} \times X) / \sim$, where $(a, t) \sim (a', t')$ when either

- $(a, t) = (a', t')$ or
- $a' \# t$ and $t' = (a' a)t$.

Compare with (α) .

Here $a' \# t$ is a semantic version of freshness judgements. Its construction goes way back [gabbay:thesis,newaas,newaas-jv] and is **not** in the scope of **this** talk.

Models of substitution

Models of **SUB** are a cartesian-closed category.

Let $\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{Y}, \mathbb{Z}$ range over such models. Suppose $t, t' \in \mathbb{X}$, $u, u' \in \mathbb{Y}$, and $f \in \mathbb{X} \Rightarrow \mathbb{Y}$.

Clearly $(t, u)[a \mapsto (t', u')] = (t[a \mapsto t'], u[a \mapsto u'])$.

The problem is to define a substitution action on f a function.

$$\begin{aligned} a \# t \vdash (f[a \mapsto g])t &= (ft)[a \mapsto gt] \\ |a| &= \lambda(t \in \mathbb{X}). |a|. \end{aligned}$$

Very simple. Arguably, very powerful.

Lambda-abstraction, as a function

$\text{abstract} \in \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{X}$ is defined by

$$\text{abstract}(t, a) = \lambda t'. t[a \mapsto t'].$$

abstract is a function that takes an argument and a name and λ -abstracts that name in its argument.

Contexts, as functions

Any $C \in \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{X}$ behaves very much like C in $C[t]$, since C may **bind in its argument**.

It's a particularly general notion of context though: **abstract** could be written as $\lambda-.-$.

Access to names

We have full access to names. For example we can write the **freshness test** $\#$ as a function f such that:

- $ft = 0$ if $a\#t$.
- $ft = 1$ if $\neg(a\#t)$.

(Assuming two ‘normal’ elements $0, 1 \in |\mathbb{X}|$).

This is not possible in the λ -calculus: fx and fy may differ, but **not** because x is called ‘ x ’. Likewise ft may differ from ft' , but **not** because $\text{fn}(t) \neq \text{fn}(t')$.

Names in this category are like variables (they can be abstracted) but they behave a little bit like pointers too.

Conclusion

Nominal algebra is a logic in which names are first-class citizens. It permits reasoning in a **very** intuitive style on languages with binding, such as FOL and the λ -calculus. Freshness, permutations, a , and X correspond to fn , α -renaming, x , and t/ϕ .

This also inspired mathematics of independent interest.

One example is a (nominal) algebraic characterisation of **variable** as **name+substitution**.

I am excited about the implications for designing programming languages.

Thank you very much for listening.